Omnicare v. Indiana State District Council and Its Rational Basis Test for Allowing for Opinion Statements to Be a Misleading Fact or Omission Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 by Elzweig, Brian & Chambers, Valrie
Pace Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 1 Fall 2016 Article 2 
March 2017 
Omnicare v. Indiana State District Council and Its Rational Basis 
Test for Allowing for Opinion Statements to Be a Misleading Fact 
or Omission Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 
Brian Elzweig 
University of West Florida 
Valrie Chambers 
Stetson University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brian Elzweig and Valrie Chambers, Omnicare v. Indiana State District Council and Its Rational 
Basis Test for Allowing for Opinion Statements to Be a Misleading Fact or Omission Under 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 37 Pace L. Rev. 55 (2017) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
55 
OMNICARE V. INDIANA STATE 
DISTRICT COUNCIL AND ITS 
RATIONAL BASIS TEST FOR 
ALLOWING FOR OPINION 
STATEMENTS TO BE A 
MISLEADING FACT OR 
OMISSION UNDER SECTION 11 
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933 
 
BRIAN ELZWEIG* 
VALRIE CHAMBERS** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), there 
was disarray in the Securities markets in the United States.  
In response, Congress passed the Securities Act to restore 
“investor confidence following a rash of corporate scandals and 
the stock market crash of 1929[;] Congress enacted the 
Securities Act of 1933 to ensure accurate reporting by 
companies in their registration statements.”1  This is evidenced 
by the Senate Report on the bill prior to passage of the 
Securities Act, which stated: “[t]he purpose of this bill is to 
protect the investing public and honest business.  The basic 
policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning 
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign 
commerce and providing protection against fraud and 
 
 *Instructor of Business Law, University of West Florida 
 ** Associate Professor, Stetson University 
1.  Richard A. Spehr et al., Securities Act Section 11: A Primer and 
Update of Recent Trends, 49 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. CONTEMP. LEGAL NOTE 
SERIES 3 (2006), http://www.wlf.org/upload/0106CLNSpehr.pdf. 
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misrepresentation.”2  Companies who sell securities to the 
public by means of interstate commerce are required to file a 
registration statement with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).3  One of the cornerstones for the 
protection of the public in securities law is Section 11 of the 
Securities Act (“Section 11”).4  Section 11 gives private 
plaintiffs actionable claims for false or misleading statements 
that are made in registration statements.5  Liability arises if 
the registration statement “contained an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading . . . .”6  The right to take action is given to “any 
person acquiring such security[,]”7 unless the issuer can prove 
that the purchaser knew of the untrue statement or omission.8  
The classes of people who can be sued for violations in 
accordance with the stated purpose of the Act are widespread.  
Section 11 includes liability for: 
 
(1) every person who signed the registration 
statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person 
performing similar functions) or partner in the 
issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the 
registration statement with respect to which his 
liability is asserted; 
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named 
in the registration statement as being or about to 
become a director, person performing similar 
functions, or partner; 
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or 
any person whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by him, who has with his 
 
2.  MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND 
REMEDIES 4A-5 n.4 (2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 47 (1933)). 
3.  15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
4.  15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).  
5.  Spehr et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
6.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id.  
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consent been named as having prepared or 
certified any part of the registration statement, 
or as having prepared or certified any report or 
valuation which is used in connection with the 
registration statement, with respect to the 
statement in such registration statement, report, 
or valuation, which purports to have been 
prepared or certified by him; 
(5) every underwriter with respect to such 
security.9 
 
Again, in keeping with the stated purpose of the Securities 
Act, in addition to having a wide range of people who can have 
potential liability (unlike many other violations of securities 
laws), a plaintiff need not prove that the misrepresentation or 
omission was done with the intent to deceive or defraud the 
purchaser.10  Instead, a potential plaintiff only has to prove 
that there was a misrepresentation or omission.11  This protects 
the public interest because scienter12 (as would be needed for a 
10b-5 securities fraud case) can be one of the more burdensome 
elements for a plaintiff to prove.13  The idea behind all of these 
elements is to protect the public by requiring that issuers make 
a “full and fair disclosure of information to the public,”14 so that 
the investing public can make informed decisions on whether to 
purchase a registered security. 
What constitutes an actionable misstatement, or where an 
omission might have led a statement not to be misleading, has 
been the focus of much litigation.  The standard to incur 
Section 11 liability arising from statements of opinion, leading 
to either a material misstatement or omission of a material 
fact, was addressed in the United States Supreme Court case of 
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction 
 
9.  Id. 
10. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
11.  Id. 
12.  Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“scienter” as “[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible 
for the consequences of his or her act or omission”). 
13.   Herman, 459 U.S. at 382.  
14.  Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988). 
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Industry Pension Fund.15  This case has far-reaching 
ramifications about what types of forward-looking statements 
may be put into registration statements and what can and 
should be omitted.  Certainly, in areas where statements of 
opinion may become actionable under Section 11, an issuer 
would be advised that including such a statement would 
become a risk, but an omission that leads to a registration 
statement becoming misleading also poses a risk.16  The 
tension between damaging omissions and over-disclosure is 
ongoing, and there is a substantial burden of proof for liability 
on the investor.  Justice Kagan argues that erring on the side 
of disclosing helps honest companies, but proving that a 
statement is false is sometimes easier than finding an omission 
and proving that it is material.17  There, the net result to the 
public would be that registration statements would contain less 
information on which purchasers would base their investing 
decisions. 
This article examines when statements in a registration 
statement, couched as opinion, can and cannot be considered to 
be misstatements of material fact that could lead to liability 
under Section 11 (and potentially other sections) of the 
Securities Act.  The rest of this paper is formatted as follows.  
We review the Omnicare case, followed by the key cases in the 
Second, Third, Ninth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals.  The 
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have all required that, in 
order for there to be an actionable claim under Section 11, the 
plaintiff must plead not only that the statement or omission 
was false, but also that the defendant had subjective 
knowledge that its opinion was false.18  The Sixth Circuit, 
although later reversed by the Supreme Court, applied a strict 
 
15.  Omnicare, Inc. v.  Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension 
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015) [hereinafter Omnicare].  
16.  Omissions that are immaterial produce no significant risk and are 
generally safely omitted.  See Spehr et al., supra note 1, at 6-7.  Immaterial 
omissions are outside the scope of this paper. 
17.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1331-32. 
18. Alexander Coley, When is a Belief or Opinion False?: Indiana State 
District Council v. Omnicare and the Contested § 11 Pleading Standard, 5 
CALIF. L. REV. 336, 337 (2014).  See also Collin R. Flake, Contrary to Popular 
Opinion: Why the Sixth Circuit’s Omnicare Decision Should Be Reversed, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 125, 127 (2015).  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2
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liability interpretation of Section 11 and required only that the 
fact or omission be false or misleading.19  The split decisions 
among the circuits may be the reason that the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.  Then, we explain the implications of these 
decisions to future registrants and to professionals preparing 
opinions that are to be included in registration statements.  
This article is important to future registrants and opining 
professionals because of their liability implications.  We 
conclude with the assumption that future cases will decide how 
to apply the new rational basis test created by the Supreme 
Court in interpreting when an opinion statement becomes a 
misstatement of material fact, or leads to an omission that 
renders a registration statement false or misleading in 
violation of Section 11. 
 
I.  Statements of Opinions as Facts 
 
The facts of the Omnicare case illustrate the need to 
determine when statements of opinions should be treated as 
just that (statements of opinion that are not actionable under 
Section 11) and, conversely, when opinions should be treated as 
fact.  The case further shows that, even absent fraud, there are 
times where a statement of opinion can rise to a material 
misstatement of fact, or lead to a material omission in which 
there would be Section 11 liability.  In particular, it appears 
that professionals may be held liable for opinions where those 
opinions were formed without a reasonable basis. 
Omnicare is a pharmaceutical company that provides 
pharmacy services for nursing home residents.20  In issuing 
common stock to the public, as required under Section 11, 
Omnicare filed a registration statement with the SEC.21  One of 
the disclosures that was required in Omnicare’s registration 
statement, as in other registration statements, was a 
description of the effects of federal and state law on its 
business.22  Part of Omnicare’s business model included the 
 
19.  See Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers et al., v. Omnicare, Inc., 719 
F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Laborers].  
20.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323.  
21.  Id. 
22.  Id.  
5
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receipt of rebates from manufacturers of the pharmaceuticals 
that it sold to the nursing homes.23  Omnicare, in reference to 
these rebates, included the following two assertions in its 
registration statement: “[1] We believe our contract 
arrangements with other healthcare providers, our 
pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in 
compliance with applicable federal and state laws;”24 and “[2] 
We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are legally and economically valid 
arrangements that bring value to the healthcare system and 
the patients that we serve.”25 
Omnicare also included further information about those 
disclosures.  Regarding the first statement, the company noted 
that there had been litigation brought by some states against 
the manufacturers of some pharmaceuticals for giving these 
types of rebates.26  The registration statement noted that laws 
relating this practice may “‘be interpreted in the future in a 
manner inconsistent with our interpretation and 
application.’”27  Omnicare also addressed the second assertion 
by including in the registration statement that the federal 
government had expressed concerns about whether acceptance 
of rebates by nursing homes was legal.28  It was further noted 
that if the acceptance of rebates was discontinued, Omnicare’s 
business would suffer.29  This registration statement became 
part of an offering of 12.8 million shares of Omnicare common 
stock to the public.30 
The plaintiffs in the case were pension funds that bought 
shares in the public offering.31  They only held the stock for a 
short period of time, selling the shares a few months after the 
offering was complete.32  Lawsuits were later brought by the 
 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. (original citations omitted). 
25.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323 (original citations omitted). 
26.  Id. at 1324.  
27.  Id. (original citations omitted).  
28.  Id.  
29.  Id. 
30.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 500. 
31.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1324. 
32.  Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers et al., v. Omnicare, Inc., 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17526, at *1, *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2012).  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2
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federal government, which alleged that the rebates that were 
given to Omnicare from the manufacturers were in violation of 
anti-kickback laws.33  Because of the federal lawsuits, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the assertions in the registration 
statement about the rebates were “‘materially false’ 
representations about legal compliance.”34  Further, it was 
alleged that Omnicare “‘omitted to state [material] facts 
necessary’ to make those representations not misleading.”35 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky granted Omnicare’s motion to dismiss the case.36  
The district court noted that statements made about the legal 
compliance concerning the kickbacks were not actionable 
because the bases of those statements were “soft 
information.”37  In its ruling, the district court stated that an 
action could only be sustained if the person who made the 
statements knew them to be untrue at the time that they were 
made.38  In supporting the dismissal of the action, the court 
noted that there were no allegations that the officers of 
Omnicare knew that they were violating this law.39 
The case was then reversed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.40  The Sixth Circuit ruled against 
precedent set in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, offering 
“a [more] liberal pleading standard under [] Section 11 . . . .”41  
The Second,42 Third,43 and Ninth44 Circuits have all ruled on 
the issue of whether opinions on soft information in a 
registration can trigger a Section 11 violation.  All three of 
 
33.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1324. 
34.  Id. (original citation omitted). 
35.  Id. (original citation omitted). 
36.  Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17526, 
at *16. 
37.  Id. at **13-14.  “Soft information includes matters of opinions and 
predictions.”  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 504. 
38.  Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17526, 
at *14.  
39.  Id. 
40.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 500.   
41.  Coley, supra note 18, at 336.   
42.  See Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011).  
43.  See In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 
F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). 
44.  See Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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those circuits required a plaintiff to show that a defendant, 
when making the opinion, subjectively believed that the stated 
opinions were false.45  The Sixth Circuit, instead, clearly “set[] 
a lower bar for potential [section] 11 claims”46 by ruling that a 
case may be brought under Section 11 “without pleading 
knowledge of falsity.”47  This circuit split led the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari to consider how Section 11 pertains to 
statements of opinion.48 The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case.49 
 
II.  The Second Circuit 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed the issue of statements of opinion being regarded as 
statements of material fact in the 2011 case of Fait v. Regions 
Financial Corp.50  The facts of Fait need to be addressed to 
show the similarity between that case and the Omnicare case.  
In 2006, Regions Financial Corporation acquired a bank 
holding company, AmSouth Bancorporation.51  The proxy 
statement allowed Regions to record any amount over the fair 
market value paid for AmSouth as goodwill for Regions.52  In 
2008, Regions, through Regions Financing Trust III (“Regions 
Trust”), made a public securities offering that included the use 
of this calculation of goodwill.53  After the merger, there were 
 
45.  Coley, supra note 18, at 337. 
46.  Id. at 338. 
47.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 505. 
48.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1324. 
49.  Id. at 1333. 
50.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 105.   
51.  Id. at 107. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id.  Note that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require 
that goodwill be tested for impairment, (Accounting Standards Codification 
350-20-35), which could happen, for example, when a company held in high 
public regard subsequently becomes the subject of a scandal or adverse 
events that tarnish its image so much that the company is not expected to be 
as profitable in the future as was previously thought.  When that happens, 
the asset labeled “goodwill” is written down (but is never less than $0.00), 
and this write-down is off-set by a loss on the income statement.  See 
generally Accounting Standards Update, 2016-03 FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 
Mar. 2016.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2
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major problems with both the housing and residential 
markets.54  Issuers of subprime mortgages were becoming 
insolvent which, in turn, had an adverse effect on the entire 
banking industry.55  During this period, there was a decline in 
the value of Regions’ stock.56  Alfred Fait, a purchaser of 
Regions Trust shares, filed a class action against both Regions 
Trust and Regions Financial Corp., as well as other 
defendants.57  The complaint alleged that “despite adverse 
trends in the mortgage and housing markets . . . [,] Regions 
failed to write down ‘goodwill’ and to sufficiently increase ‘loan 
loss reserves.’”58  This led to the allegation that the defendants, 
in their offering documents, issued “‘negligently false and 
misleading’ statements concerning goodwill and loan loss 
reserves.”59  The complaint stated that “Regions overstated 
goodwill and falsely stated that it was not impaired, and ‘vastly 
underestimated’ Regions’ loan loss reserves and failed to 
disclose that they were inadequate.”60  Using this as a basis, 
the complaint alleged that these statements constituted 
misstatements or omissions of material facts in violation of 
Sections 11(a), 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act.61  The 
courts did not examine the claim under Section 15 of the 
Securities Act.  This is because a Section 15 claim involves a 
person who controls another person who is liable under Section 
11 or 12 of the Act.62  Since both Sections 11 and 12 refer to 
misrepresentations of material fact,63 and neither requires 
scienter,64 the courts examined these claims together. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York dismissed the case.65  The dismissal was based on 
the defendants’ claim that the “statements regarding goodwill 
 
54.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 107.   
55.  Id.  
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 108.  
58.  Id.  
59.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 108. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. at 110 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012)). 
63.  Id. at 110. 
64.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 109. 
65.  Id. at 108. 
9
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and the adequacy of loan loss reserves were matters of opinion, 
which were not actionable because the complaint failed to 
allege that those opinions were not truly held at the time they 
were made.”66  The district court held that goodwill reflected on 
the balance sheets illustrated judgments of the values that 
could not be objectively determined.67  As with goodwill, the 
court held that the adequacy of reserves was also a statement 
of opinion.68  According to the district court, in order for there 
to have been an actionable claim, the plaintiffs would have had 
to plead that the “defendants did not honestly hold those 
opinions at the time they were expressed.”69 
The Second Circuit, in examining the claims, relied heavily 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia Bankshares v. 
Sandburg.70  Virginia Bankshares also involved a freeze-out 
merger between a bank and its wholly owned subsidiary.71  The 
acquiring bank, even though it was not required to, issued a 
proxy on the merger to its minority shareholders.72  The 
minority shareholders accused the directors of falsely stating 
that the shareholders were being offered a “high” and “fair” 
value for their stock in the proxy statement.73  It was alleged 
that this was a material false or misleading statement in 
violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“the Exchange Act”) and its associated SEC Rule 14.74  The 
Court considered the question of “whether statements of 
reasons, opinions, or beliefs are statements ‘with respect to . . . 
material fact[s]’ so as to fall within the strictures of [Rule 14(a)-
9].”75  The Court held that the directors’ statements of reason 
or belief were statements of fact “in two senses: as statements 
that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief 
stated and as statements about the subject matter of the 
 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. at 109. 
68.  Id.  
69.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 109. 
70.  Id. at 111 (citing Va. Bankshares v. Sandburg, 501 U.S. 1083 
(1991)). 
71.  Sandburg, 501 U.S. at 1087-88. 
72.  Id. at 1088. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. at 1091.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2
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reason or belief expressed.”76 
Virginia Bankshares requires that a misstatement of 
opinion be both objectively and subjectively false for a Section 
14(a) claim.77  Professor James D. Cox of Southern Methodist 
University succinctly simplified the holding in Virginia 
Bankshares when it comes to purported statements of opinion: 
“[O]pinion statements are statements of facts when there is 
before the defendant objective evidence in direct conflict with 
the professed opinion.  Absent conflicting objective evidence, 
the opinion statement is not a ‘fact’ but a non-actionable 
misrepresentation of the defendant’s belief or motive.”78 
During its examination of Virginia Bankshares, the Second 
Circuit in Fait noted that, although Virginia Bankshares 
involved claims regarding improper proxy solicitation under 
Section 14 (a) of the Exchange Act, it was applying the same 
reasoning to the claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the 
Securities Act.79  The Second Circuit, using the rationale of 
Virginia Bankshares, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the action.80  In its examination of the plaintiffs’ claims that 
the estimates of goodwill were actionable misstatements of 
fact, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ claims were rooted in 
adverse market conditions.81  The claim relies on an assertion 
that Regions should have used different assessments about the 
market conditions, which would have led to different 
conclusions about the amount of goodwill in the registration 
statement.82  The court held that the since the complaint did 
not allege that the defendants did not believe the statements 
about goodwill at the time that they were made, that “[u]nder 
Virginia Bankshares and our related cases, such an omission is 
fatal to plaintiff’s Section 11 and 12 claims.”83  The plaintiffs 
claimed that this approach essentially required a plaintiff to 
 
76.  Sandburg, 501 U.S. at 1092. 
77.  Id.  
78.  James D. Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements after Omnicare: Securities 
Fraud Suits for Failures to Comply with the Law, 68 SMU L. REV. 715, 715 
(2015). 
79.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 111 n.4. 
80.  Id. at 109. 
81.  Id. at 112. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id.  
11
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plead scienter, which is not a necessary element of a claim 
under the Securities Act.84  The court ruled that it “do[es] not 
view a requirement that a plaintiff plausibly allege that 
defendant misstated his truly held belief and an allegation that 
defendant did so with fraudulent intent as one and the same.”85 
Similarly, using Virginia Bankshares, the Second Circuit 
examined the plaintiffs’ claims that the amount of the loan loss 
reserves was a misstatement or omission of a material fact.86  
The court held that the plaintiffs did not allege any objective 
standards for setting the loan loss reserves.87  In its holding, 
the court stated: 
 
in order for the alleged statements regarding the 
adequacy of loan loss reserves to give rise to 
liability under sections 11 and 12, plaintiff must 
allege that defendant’s opinions were both false 
and not honestly believed when they were made. 
Because the complaint does not plausibly allege 
subjective falsity, it fails to state a claim.88 
 
III.  The Third Circuit 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether an opinion can be considered a 
material misstatement or omission in In re: Donald J. Trump 
Casino Securities Litigation (“Trump”).89  In Trump, the 
language of a prospectus for a bond issuance for the financing 
of the Taj Mahal Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey was at 
issue.90  The plaintiffs alleged that language in the prospectus, 
which stated that “[t]he Partnership believes that funds 
generated from the operation of the Taj Mahal will be sufficient 
to cover all of its debt service (interest and principal),” was 
 
84.  Fait, 655 F.3d at 109. 
85.  Id. at 112 n.5. 
86.  Id. at 113.  
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Trump, 7 F.3d at 357. 
90.  Id. at 364. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/2
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misleading.91  It was alleged that the defendants had “neither 
an honest belief in nor a reasonable basis” for this statement.92  
This and other statements in the prospectus (which are not 
germane to this article) were alleged to have been a violation of 
several sections of the Securities Act.93  The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiffs appealed to 
the Third Circuit.94 
For most of the issues, both the district court and the 
Third Circuit used the “bespeaks caution” doctrine as a 
linchpin for rendering their decisions.95  Instead of addressing 
the question of whether opinion statements rise to the level of 
believable fact, the bespeaks caution doctrine primarily 
addresses the materiality of statements made in connection 
with the sale of securities.96  The bespeaks caution doctrine 
holds that, if there are sufficient cautionary statements in the 
prospectus, the misrepresentations or omissions are rendered 
inactionable.97  In essence, the bespeaks caution doctrine 
allows for a prospectus to have enough warnings that the 
subject matter of the warnings should be taken with caution as 
to their materiality in a decision to purchase a security.98  Even 
though the bespeaks caution doctrine was the primary reason 
that the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case, the 
court did address opinion statements in light of Virginia 
Bankshares and its effect on the bespeaks caution doctrine; the 
court stated that Virginia Bankshares bolstered the defense 
provided to the defendants in their opinion statements by the 
bespeaks caution doctrine.99 The court interpreted Virginia 
Bankshares, stating: “a speaker’s subjective disbelief or 
motivation, standing alone, would be inadequate to state a 
 
91.  Id. at 365. 
92.  Id. at 366. 
93.  Id. at 364. 
94.  Trump, 7 F.3d at 364. 
95.  Id. at 371.  
96.  Id. 
97.  Id.  There is literature on the subject of the bespeaks caution 
doctrine and its applicability to specific situations, but this analysis is not 
necessary for this article.  
98.  Id. at 364. 
99.  Trump, 7 F.3d at 372. 
13
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claim under § 14(a).”100  The Third Circuit also applied Virginia 
Bankshares to the bespeaks caution doctrine, stating: “by 
recognizing that an accompanying statement may neutralize 
the effect of a misleading statement, the [Virginia Bankshares] 
Court impliedly accepted the logic of the bespeaks caution 
doctrine.”101 
IV.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
The case of Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, decided in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
addressed the issue of opinion statements being asserted as a 
misstatement or omission of a material fact in a pleading for a 
securities law violation.102  Rubke essentially turns on the 
heightened pleading requirements under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act and Section 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in allegations of violations of securities laws.103  
This article will only concentrate on the facts and analyses that 
are relevant to the heightened pleading requirement. 
Capitol Bancorp filed a registration statement for an 
exchange offer in an attempt to acquire Napa Community 
Bank.104  The offer document was given with two fairness 
opinions, both of which stated that the share exchange was 
“fair from a financial point of view.”105  The plaintiffs in this 
case were dissident shareholders who disagreed with the terms 
of the offer and alleged that the terms were couched in fraud 
and misrepresentation.106  The district court, relying on Rule 
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled that, since 
claims against Capitol Bancorp “sound[] in fraud,” the claims 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act must be pled with 
particularity.107  Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, 
 
100.  Id.  It should be noted that, similar to the Second Circuit, the Third 
Circuit expanded the rationale of Virginia Bankshares to cases arising under 
securities law violations other than Section 14 of the Exchange Act, including 
Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act.  Id. at 369.  
101.  Id. at 372. 
102.  Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009). 
103.  Id. at 1160. 
104.  Id. at 1159. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 1166.  
107.  Rubke, 551 F.3d at 1161.   
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a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.”108 
The district court ruled that this requirement was not met, 
and the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.109  In 
determining what the proper pleading requirements are in the 
case, the Ninth Circuit discussed the fairness opinions 
statements.110  The court, citing Virginia Bankshares as 
authority, stated: “[b]ecause these fairness determinations are 
alleged to be misleading opinions, not statements of fact, they 
can give rise to a claim under Section 11 only if the complaint 
alleges with particularity that the statements were both 
objectively and subjectively false or misleading.”111  The court 
then used this reasoning to determine that, to plead with 
particularity as required, the plaintiffs would have had to 
allege in the complaint that either that the writers of the 
fairness opinions or Capitol Bancorp believed that the proposed 
deal was unfair.112  There was no such claim in the complaint, 
and the Section 11 violation allegation was dismissed.113 
 
V.  The Sixth Circuit Omnicare Decision 
 
In Indiana State District Council of Laborers et al., v. 
Omnicare, Inc., (“Laborers”), the Sixth Circuit addressed 
whether opinion statements could be used as the basis of a 
material misstatement or omission claim for Section 11.114  At 
issue were the two statements in the legal compliance section 
of its registration statement that were litigated in the 
Omnicare district court case,115 which indicated that 
Omnicare’s officers felt that the kickback agreement with 
pharmaceutical companies was in compliance with the law and 
 
108.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
109.  Rubke, 551 F.3d at 1158. 
110.  Id. at 1161-62. 
111.  Id. at 1162. 
112.  Id. at 1165.  
113.  Id. 
114.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 500. 
115.  Id. at 501. 
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constituted “legally and economically valid arrangements.”116  
The kickbacks were later found to be illegal.117  Then, in 
considering whether these two statements were misleading 
(either directly or indirectly), the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
departed from the other circuit courts that have addressed this 
issue.118 
The Sixth Circuit in Laborers, like the Ninth Circuit in 
Rubke, held that the Section 11 claim in this case did sound in 
fraud, and was therefore subject to the heightened pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.119  The court held that in order to state a fraud 
claim with particularity to meet the heightened pleading 
requirement, “a plaintiff [must] allege the time, place, and 
content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she 
relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the 
defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud.”120  The 
court then noted that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”121  In 
its examination of the pleading requirements, the Sixth Circuit 
overruled the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint must allege that the defendants knew that the 
statements of legal compliance were false at the time they were 
made.122  The Sixth Circuit stated that a Section 11 claim was 
one of strict liability, without the need to examine the speaker’s 
state of mind.123  The court, referring to Section 11, stated that 
the plaintiffs only need to show that, at the time of the effective 
date of the registration statement, it “contained an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading.”124 
Regarding omissions, Omnicare cited parallels to a case 
 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id.  
118.  Id.at 506. 
119.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 502-03. 
120.  Id. at 503 (quoting Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447 
F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
121.  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). 
122.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 503. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C § 77k(a)).  
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brought under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange 
Act.125  Omnicare argued that, since the statements of legal 
compliance are soft information, they need not be disclosed.126  
Since there is no requirement to release soft information, 
Omnicare felt that there should be no liability for an omission 
related to the legal compliance statements.127  The Sixth 
Circuit responded that when a company elects to remain silent 
regarding soft information, the company is not liable under 
Section 10 of the Exchange Act (and therefore presumably not 
liable under Section 11 as well).128  However, this is only true 
when a company remains “completely silent.”129  Since 
Omnicare addressed the issues of legal compliance (when it 
was not required to), the court stated that “the protections for 
soft information end where [that] speech begins.”130  The court 
reasoned that once information is disclosed, it becomes subject 
to the scrutiny of the securities laws.131 When there is 
knowledge of falsity in the disclosure, opinions are no longer 
soft information, but instead become hard facts.132  Omnicare 
then argued that, even if the statements could be taken as fact 
and contained a falsity, they could only be actionable if the 
plaintiffs could prove that there was knowledge of the falsity at 
the time the statements were made.133  The court disagreed 
with this analysis, reasoning that a claim under Section 10b 
and Rule 10b-5 requires scienter as a basic element of the 
claim.134 However, the same is not true for a Section 11 claim; 
the court stated: 
 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a plaintiff 
to prove scienter, § 11 is a strict liability statute. 
It makes sense that a defendant cannot be liable 
 
125.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 504. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id.  
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 504 (quoting Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 
540, 560 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 
131.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 504. 
 132.  Id. at 505. 
133.  Id.   
134.  Id. 
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for a fraudulent misstatement or omission under 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if he did not know a 
statement was false at the time it was made. The 
statement cannot be fraudulent if the defendant 
did not know it was false.  Section § 11, however, 
provides for strict liability when a registration 
statement “contain[s] an untrue statement of a 
material fact.” No matter the framing, once a 
false statement has been made, a defendant’s 
knowledge is not relevant to a strict liability 
claim.135 
 
Pursuant to the court’s judgment in Laborers, when a 
defendant discloses information, knowledge of the falsity of the 
information is irrelevant in a strict liability claim.136  “Under 
§ 11, however, if the defendant discloses information that 
includes a material misstatement, that is sufficient and a 
complaint may survive a motion to dismiss without pleading 
knowledge of falsity.”137  The court then went further and 
specifically rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Fait 
and the Ninth Circuit in Rubke.138  In doing so, the Sixth 
Circuit also refused to extend the holding in Virginia 
Bankshares to a Section 11 claim.139  Virginia Bankshares, in 
interpreting a claim under Section 14a of the Exchange Act, 
had stated that a plaintiff is required to prove objective falsity, 
not just the belief of falsity.140  The Sixth Circuit in Laborers 
noted that the Supreme Court in Virginia Bankshares did not 
address whether a plaintiff must additionally plead knowledge 
of the falsity.141  Further, the Sixth Circuit noted that Virginia 
Bankshares did not discuss scienter, and instead “limited its 
discussion to statements of opinion and belief that it presumed 
 
135.  Id. (original citations omitted). 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 505-06.  The Sixth Circuit did not address the Third Circuit 
case In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357 
(3d Cir. 1993), discussed infra p. 66. 
139.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 506-07. 
140.  Id. at 506. 
141.  Id. 
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were made with knowledge of falsity . . . .”142  The Sixth Circuit 
opined that the Supreme Court reserved the question of the 
necessity of scienter for a Section 14 claim, and that in Virginia 
Bankshares, the “jury in [that] case had already found 
knowledge of falsity—whether necessary or not—and 
proceeded from there.”143 
Using this reasoning, the Sixth Circuit stated that both the 
Second and Ninth Circuits had overreached by applying the 
logic of Virginia Bankshares to a Section 11 claim.144  Since the 
Supreme Court had assumed that there was knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements relevant in Virginia Bankshares, the 
Sixth Circuit presumed that the Supreme Court was treating 
scienter as a requirement for a Section 14(a) violation.145  The 
Sixth Circuit concluded that, since Section 11 does not require 
scienter, Virginia Bankshares has “very limited application” to 
it.146  Instead, the Sixth Circuit stated that the proper 
precedent to use in determining the pleading requirements 
against Omnicare was Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,147 
which had previously ruled that claims under Section 11 were 
properly brought under the theory of strict liability.148  Using 
this logic, the Sixth Circuit in Laborers explicitly refused “to 
extend Virginia Bankshares to impose a knowledge of falsity 
requirement upon § 11 claims.”149 
 
VI.  The Supreme Court Omnicare Decision 
 
Presumably due to the circuit split created by the Sixth 
Circuit in the Omnicare case, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.150  Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan phrased 
the issue before the Court as follows: 
 
 
142.  Id.  
143.  Id. 
144.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 506-07. 
145.  Id.  
146.  Id. at 507. 
147.  Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 375. 
148.  Laborers, 719 F.3d at 507.  
149.  Id. 
150.  See generally Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1318.  
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Before a company may sell securities in 
interstate commerce, it must file a registration 
statement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). If that document either 
“contain[s] an untrue statement of a material 
fact” or “omit[s] to state a material fact . . . 
necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading,” a purchaser of the stock may sue for 
damages. This case requires us to decide how 
each of those phrases applies to statements of 
opinion.151 
 
As did the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court focused on the 
two statements in the legal compliance section of Omnicare’s 
registration statement in which Omnicare opined that the 
kickback agreements were legally compliant and economically 
sound.152  In addressing the issue, the Court examined the 
Sixth Circuit’s approach.153  The Court disagreed with the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding “that a statement of opinion that is 
ultimately found incorrect—even if believed at the time made—
may count as an ‘untrue statement of a material fact’ . . . 
[because it] wrongly conflates facts and opinions.”154  The Court 
explained that a fact is something that expresses certainty of a 
thing, whereas an opinion does not.155  The Court held that 
when it comes to a statement of opinion, there could still be an 
actionable claim brought under Section 11.156  It was noted that 
when an opinion statement contains one fact, “the speaker 
actually holds the stated belief.”157  Citing Virginia 
Bankshares, the Court noted that in order for the legal 
compliance claims to be false or misleading statements of 
material fact, allowing for a Section 11 claim, Omnicare would 
have had to have believed that the company was indeed 
 
151.  Id. at 1323 (citing 15 U.S.C § 77k(a)). 
152.  Id. at 1324.  
153.  Id. at 1325. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325.  
156.  Id. at 1326. 
157.  Id. 
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breaking the law when it stated that it believed it was not.158  
The Court then took this argument to its extreme, stating that 
one could not just make a statement that is embedded within 
statements of fact and avoid liability by couching it in terms of 
opinion.159  Justice Kagan applied Virginia Bankshares as 
illustrated through a hypothetical involving a CEO of a 
company saying: “I believe our TVs have the highest resolution 
available because we use a patented technology to which our 
competitors do not have access.”160  This statement would not 
address the CEO’s state of mind, but it would affirm “an 
underlying fact: that the company uses a patented 
technology.”161 
The Court, addressing the two statements of legal 
compliance in the registration statement, stated that the 
plaintiffs could not prevail by claiming that these were untrue 
statements of material fact.162  The statements were held to be 
“pure statement[s] of opinion.”163  Even though Omnicare’s 
belief about violating the anti-kickback laws turned out to be 
wrong, the belief was sincerely held at the time the registration 
statement was filed.164  Just because an opinion in a 
registration statement later turns out to be wrong, that does 
not allow for Section 11 liability as an untrue statement of 
material fact.165 
The Court then addressed whether Omnicare “omitted to 
state facts necessary” to make its opinions on its legal 
compliance with the anti-kickback laws “not misleading” to a 
reasonable investor.166  It was plaintiffs’ contention that 
Omnicare’s omission would lead to a Section 11 violation.167  In 
 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. at 1327. 
160.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327.  
161.  Id. at 1328. 
162.  Id.  
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1328.  
166.  Id. at 1327. 
167.  Id.  Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, did not find it 
necessary to address omissions because he believed that it should be 
remanded without discussion to the lower court to decide the issue. Id. at 
1337 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The majority however, disagreed and noted 
that although the plaintiffs could have written a clearer complaint, the 
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response, Omnicare argued that it is not possible for an opinion 
statement to convey anything to a reasonable person other 
than the speaker’s own mindset.168  Therefore, if an opinion is 
sincerely held, it cannot be misleading, which causes Section 11 
liability “regardless [of] what related facts the speaker has 
omitted.”169  The Court rejected Omnicare’s interpretation of 
the Virginia Bankshares decision that that there could never be 
liability for an omission related to making an opinion 
statement.170  Omnicare, in making its assertion, was primarily 
relying on Virginia Bankshares’ statement that “[a] statement 
of belief may be open to objection . . . solely as a misstatement 
of the psychological fact of the speaker’s belief in what he 
says.”171  The court replied that Omnicare, by taking that 
sentence as an absolute prohibition, was taking it out of 
context; Justice Kagan wrote that if there is a statement of 
legal compliance in a registration statement, it could be 
misleading if it were incomplete.172  A reasonable person 
purchasing securities would believe that the opinion was based 
on something other than mere intuition, even if belief in the 
statement were sincerely held.173  The investor would 
reasonably believe that the statement was based on a 
meaningful legal inquiry.174  An opinion would also be so 
incomplete by an omission as to be misleading if the statement 
was made “in the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or with 
knowledge that the Federal Government was taking the 
opposite view . . . .”175  The opinion must not be believed by the 
issuer, but it also must also reflect the information that the 
issuer has.176  The Court stated: 
 
[I]f a registration statement omits material facts 
 
question of omissions was raised and was an integral part of the claims 
sought.  Id. at 1325.  
168.  Id. at 1328. 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. at 1329 n.7 (quoting Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1095). 
172.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1328. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id.  
175.  Id. at 1329. 
176.  Id. 
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about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge 
concerning a statement of opinion, and if those 
facts conflict with what a reasonable investor 
would take from the statement itself, then §11’s 
omissions clause creates liability.177 
 
Further, the Court noted that an opinion statement is not 
misleading if it omits a fact that concerns weighing disparate 
facts that created the opinion.178  A reasonable investor should 
expect that an opinion may come from the weighing of 
competing facts.179  It was noted that a “reasonable investor 
does not expect that every fact known to an issuer supports its 
opinion statement.”180 
The Court also held that when determining whether an 
omission makes a statement misleading, the context must be 
taken into account.181  While the investor would not expect a 
registration statement to contain baseless, off-the-cuff 
judgments, any statements must be read in a broader context 
of the entire statement.182  The Court stated that “[t]he 
reasonable investor understands a statement of opinion in its 
full context, and §11 creates liability only for the omission of 
material facts that cannot be squared with such a fair 
reading.”183 
The Court reasoned that if it interpreted Virginia 
Bankshares the way that Omnicare had argued, liability could 
be nullified if any sentence started with phrases such as “we 
believe” or “we think,” even though statements may still be 
misleading.184  The Court remanded the question to the lower 
courts to decide if there is a factual basis to conclude that the 
omission made the statements of legal compliance 
misleading.185  The Court instructed the lower courts that a 
 
177.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329. 
178.  Id.  
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. at 1330. 
182.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1330. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. at 1331. 
185.  Id. at 1333.  
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complaint is not sufficient just by claiming that an opinion was 
wrong; the basis for the opinion must also be called into 
question.186  In order to have a valid claim, the plaintiffs would 
have to show that one or more facts was left out of the 
registration statement, and that the omitted fact “rendered 
Omnicare’s legal compliance opinions misleading . . . because 
the excluded fact shows that Omnicare lacked the basis for 
making those statements that a reasonable investor would 
expect.”187  The Court further noted that this must be done in 
the context of not only the surrounding language in the 
registration statement, but also in the context of why they may 
or may not have excluded an outside expert’s advice in forming 
the stated opinion.188 
 
VII.  The Tenth Circuit 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in MHC Mutual Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill 
posed the following question: “[w]hen does Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 impose liability on issuers who offer 
opinions about future events?”189  This case is interesting 
because it occurred prior to Omnicare.  The case involved a 
secondary stock offering by United Western Bancorp, Inc. 
(“Bancorp”) issued after the 2008 financial crisis.190  In its 
registration statement, the company stated it held a significant 
amount of mortgage-backed securities, which had lost much of 
their value during the crisis due to homeowner defaults.191  It 
was further stated, however, that it had conducted internal 
analyses and had consulted independent experts, which led 
them to believe that the level of delinquencies and defaults had 
likely leveled off and the values of its securities would 
rebound.192  However, it also stated that it would have to 
 
186.  Id. 
187.  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1333. 
188.  Id. 
189.  MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, 
L.P., 761 F.3d 1109, 1110 (10th Cir. 2014). 
190.  Id. at 1111. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. 
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recognize additional losses if adverse market conditions lasted 
longer than their analyses suggested.193  Bancorp’s opinion in 
its registration statement that losses had leveled off did not 
come true, and instead the markets remained depressed for the 
next fifteen months, causing Bancorp to recognize another $69 
million in losses.194  Investors sued over the additional loss 
recognition under the theory that the opinion statement about 
the rebound, which later proved to be false, was an untrue 
statement of material fact in violation of Section 11.195 
When determining when a statement of opinion could be 
recognized as a material false statement for Section 11 
liability, the Tenth Circuit noted that there were three 
different approaches that could be taken.196  The first approach 
examined by the court was that, since the statute itself only 
speaks of misstatements of fact, statements of opinion could 
not be subject to Section 11 liability at all.197  The court stated 
that some contemporary scholars at the time of the creation of 
the Securities Act believed that relying on an opinion is 
foolish.198  It was further noted that the SEC, until the 1970s, 
prohibited companies from issuing opinions related to future 
speculation because it believed that the typical investor was “as 
competent as anyone to predict the future from the given 
facts.”199  The court seemed to indicate that the first approach 
was flawed under the analyses that the Second, Third and 
Ninth Circuits used, relying on Virginia Bankshares.200 
The Tenth Circuit examined a second approach, stating 
that an opinion statement is often interpreted as a statement of 
fact as to the state of mind of the speaker of the statement, and 
the speaker actually believes the opinion as it is stated.201  The 
court then repeated the subjective falsity used in the other 
circuits—that a plaintiff must show both that an opinion was 
 
193.  Id. 
194.  MHC, 761 F.3d at 1111.  
195.  Id. at 1121.  
196.  Id. at 1113. 
197.  Id. at 1111-12. 
198.  Id. at 1112. 
199.  Id. (quoting Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal 
Securities Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961)). 
200.  MHC, 761 F.3d at 1113.  
201.  Id. 
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not a real opinion (subjective disbelief), and that the opinion 
turned out to be incorrect (objective falsity).202 
The most interesting aspect of this case, especially since 
the opinion was issued prior to the Omnicare Supreme Court 
decision, is the third approach examined by the court.  The 
Tenth Circuit also examined an approach similar to the one 
that was taken in the Omnicare Supreme Court decision.203  
The court noted that common law misrepresentation claims are 
often brought against fiduciaries that hold themselves out to be 
experts and then make an opinion that lacks “an objectively 
reasonable basis.”204  The court noted that the expectation of 
some professionals, such as attorneys, is that when they make 
an opinion of future occurrences, the opinion is based on a 
reasonable amount of research or expertise.205 
The court noted that this approach was examined by many 
courts “in the securities context, though it is difficult to find 
many actually holding a security issuer liable on this 
basis . . . .”206  The Tenth Circuit then examined why courts had 
not used this rational basis test for the opinion statements in a 
securities context; first, the court wondered if Virginia 
Bankshares precluded this since it did not mention any 
alternatives to the subjective falsity test that it created.207  
While noting that many have understood that to be the case, 
the Tenth Circuit also (maybe prophetically) noted that 
Supreme Court may not have intended the creation of one test 
to exclude all others.208  Second, the court stated that the plain 
meaning of the statute, by not including statements of opinion 
as a trigger for liability, may have excluded a requirement that 
the speaker have an objective basis for an opinion.209  The third 
reason that the court proffered for the rational basis test not 
 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. at 1115-16. 
204.  Id. at 1115. 
205.  MHC, 761 F.3d at 1115. 
206.  Id. at 1116.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas quoted 
MHC for this notion which was the only mention of the case in the Supreme 
Court Omnicare decision. See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1337 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
207.  MHC, 761 F.3d at 1116. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
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being used is that, while modern common law authorities view 
securities issuers as fiduciaries of investors, this has not 
always been the case.210  Many early commentators and the 
SEC itself have, for much of its history, treated the issuers of 
securities  as “more like sellers of goods whose crystal balls are 
thought no better than anyone else’s.”211 
The fourth, and probably most intriguing reason in light of 
the Omincare outcome, is that the Tenth Circuit wondered if 
the goal of investor protection would be overall enhanced by a 
rational basis test.212  Opposite of Justice Kagan’s prediction of 
no real effect on honest issuers, the Tenth Circuit wondered if 
“[r]equiring more extensive disclosure of evidence tending to 
undermine a sincerely held opinion may, in the view of some, 
do more to invite information overload than materially benefit 
the consumer.”213  Ultimately, in MHC, the court did not say 
what test it was using, but rather stated that in this case it did 
not matter, since under a factual analysis, the plaintiffs would 
fail under any of the tests.214 
 
VIII.  Policy Issues 
 
A. Will the Rational Basis Standard from the Omnicare 
Decision Cause an Increase in Section 11 Claims? 
 
When the Sixth Circuit decided Omnicare, many 
commenters suggested that the Sixth Circuit would become the 
new hotspot for securities litigation.215  It was thought, and 
probably correctly so, that having a lower bar for pleading 
Section 11 claims would make bringing a case in the Sixth 
Circuit more attractive than trying the case in other circuits.  
It makes inherent sense that plaintiffs in securities cases, 
 
210.  Id. at 1117. 
211.  Id. 
212.  MHC, 761 F.3d at 1117. 
213.  Id.  
214.  Id. 
215.  See James Grohsgal & Amy Ross, The Sixth Circuit - The New 
Hotspot for Section 11 Suits, SEC. LITIG., INVESTIGATIONS & ENF’T (May 29, 
2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-litigation/2013/05/29/the-sixth-
circuit-the-new-hotspot-for-section-11-suits/.  See also Coley, supra note 18 at 
337; Flake, supra note 18. 
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especially class action cases which often allow for selection of 
multiple forums, would rather plead in a jurisdiction that 
allows one to only plead only that an opinion is objectively 
wrong than to have to prove that the opinion was rendered 
with subjective knowledge of the falsity.  The issue of forum 
shopping may have been largely eliminated by the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of the Sixth Circuit.  However, the question 
that now arises is whether the Supreme Court decision will 
lead to Section 11 ligation, itself, becoming a hotspot. 
Commenters have opined that the Supreme Court in 
Omnicare rejected the subjective falsity test that was used in 
the Second and Ninth Circuits, and that the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in the Omnicare case will see this as a victory.216  
Instead, the Supreme Court decision in Omnicare has created a 
rational basis test, i.e. that in order to recover, “an investor 
cannot state a claim by alleging only that an opinion was 
wrong; the complaint must as well call into question the issuer’s 
basis for offering the opinion.”217  Prior to the Omnicare 
decision, in the Second and Ninth Circuits (which see the 
majority of securities litigation), one would have had to plead 
that the defendant did not subjectively believe that the 
statement was misleading when it was stated.218  After 
Omnicare, it appears that that theory would still hold, but 
alternatively, liability could be found where, even if belief in 
the statement was truly held, the belief was based on 
information on which should not have led to the opinion 
stated.219  The same would go for omissions.  The Omnicare 
decision makes it clear that an opinion statement may be 
actionable if it omits information that a reasonable investor 
would perceive as rendering the opinion misleading.220  The 
opinion should be based on the information available, and if 
there is available information that should have changed the 
opinion, the omission of this information would become 
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actionable.221  The court also noted that off-the-cuff opinions 
also would be actionable, because a reasonable investor would 
believe that an opinion statement in a formal doctrine, such as 
a registration statement, carries with it that the issuer 
“know[s] the facts that justify it.”222  This would allow for an 
investor to plead not just subjective falsity of an opinion, but 
also that the basis for the opinion was not rational as 
interpreted by a reasonable investor. 
Justice Kagan was not specific as to what constituted a 
reasonable basis for an opinion, but she may have been 
drawing a parallel to a concept long-existent and codified in 
professions that regularly express opinions.  For example, one 
auditing standard requires that a CPA exercise due 
professional care in the performance of the audit and 
preparation of the audit opinion.223  And, there have been many 
tort and malpractice liability cases that try to apply this 
general concept to varied, specific fact sets.224 
The Court’s Omnicare decision has been hailed as a win by 
the securities plaintiffs’ bar, but the true effect of the decision 
has yet to be determined.225  The Court, by addressing the 
pleading standards for a case to move forward alleging that an 
opinion statement violated Section 11, noted that it was “no 
small task for an investor” to show that the opinion was not 
rationally based on relevant information.226  The court 
reasoned that to prove this: 
 
[t]he investor must identify particular (and 
material) facts going to the basis for the issuer’s 
opinion—facts about the inquiry the issuer did or 
did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did 
not have—whose omission makes the opinion 
statement at issue misleading to a reasonable 
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person reading the statement fairly and in 
context.227 
 
To be successful in the claim, a plaintiff would have to be 
able to show on a case-by case basis that there was actual 
information that was available that rendered that opinion 
statement misleading; a plaintiff would prevail merely by 
alleging in general statements that the opinion was wrong or 
that the opinion did not derive from a reasonable basis.228  The 
need to show particularity as to what actually caused the 
statement to be false or misleading is thought by some to moot 
much of the advantage that a plaintiff’s claim received from the 
Omnicare decision.229 
 
B. Will the Omnicare Decision Cause Less Disclosure in 
Securities Offerings? 
 
Another concern that was raised in response to the Sixth 
Circuit’s Omnicare decision is that, since opinion statements 
are generally comprised of soft information, there is no 
affirmative duty to disclose the opinions in the first place.230  
However, once information is disclosed in a registration 
statement, that disclosure would seem to increase the risk of 
liability to the disclosing company, and conversely may also 
decrease the risk to the investor, which affects the issue price 
of the security.231  Disclosing soft information in a registration 
statement affects issue price in two ways.  First, the disclosure 
of information allows investors to benefit from the information 
itself.  Projections of future warnings and stock price 
movements allow investors that invest to have a clearer view of 
the company in which the investment is being made.232  This 
awareness allows for the investors to lower uncertainty, which 
decreases the transaction costs.233  This, in turn, would make 
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stocks with optional disclosures more attractive, making the 
price of those stocks higher, and increasing overall market 
efficiency for honest companies.  Thus, lowering the incentive 
to disclose information would likely lead to an overall drop in 
investment activity and market efficiency.234  This would lead 
to a result that is contrary to Justice Kagan’s position in the 
Omnicare case that market forces, in the attempt to sell the 
securities, would not substantially alter the amount of 
disclosure in registration statements.235 
Secondly, however, the lower bar for pleading would also 
likely lead to more litigation based on the opinions in the 
registration statements.  Companies would have an increased 
likelihood for lawsuits being brought against it, and increased 
litigation would lead to a decrease in stock value.236  In both 
the Virginia Bankshares237 case and the Omnicare case,238 the 
defendants were sued based on voluntary disclosures.  Thus, it 
has been suggested that making voluntary disclosures would 
lead to an unfair punishment of companies who publish their 
views on legal compliance (and by caveat other things as well), 
since investors may bring suits on slim evidence, essentially 
betting that the company did not comply with the law.239  
Justice Kagan addressed this concern in the Supreme Court 
decision, but again, only time will tell how the outcome of the 
Court’s decision will affect Section 11 litigation.  Certainly, the 
Supreme Court opinion would less likely lead to litigation than 
that of the Sixth Circuit interpretation, but it also seems that 
the Court’s opinion might allow for more litigation than those 
in Fait and Rubke. Justice Kagan, in allowing for a rational 
basis test for claims of misstatements and omissions, states 
that this does derive from policy issues.240  However, Justice 
Kagan notes that policy decisions are left to Congress, and not 
the courts.241  In her interpretation, she stated that “Section 
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11’s omissions clause, as applied to statements of both opinion 
and fact, necessarily brings the reasonable person into the 
analysis, and asks what she would naturally understand a 
statement to convey beyond its literal meaning.”242 
The Court reasoned that considering the foundation on 
which an issuer based an opinion is a “feature” and not a “bug” 
of the omissions provision.243  Congress’ stated purpose in 
adopting Section 11 is to “ensure that issuers ‘tell [] the whole 
truth’ to investors.”244  By requiring that an opinion have a 
rational basis, the Court rationalized that more accurate 
information (i.e. the whole truth) would be communicated to 
investors.245  The Court also suggested that the requirement 
that the basis for stating the claim be pled with specificity, not 
with general or conclusory statements, which would quell much 
of the litigation that Omnicare claimed to foresee.246  The Court 
also stated that it does not think that issuers will “chill 
disclosures useful to investors” by withholding opinion 
statements, because there is nothing to indicate that Section 
11’s applicability to factual assertion has led to that result.247  
The Court rationalizes this by saying that sellers of stock have 
a strong incentive to try to sell the stock.248  Market forces push 
back against under-disclosing information, so essentially these 
forces will overcome the desire not to disclose opinions.249  The 
Court even gave information on how an issuer can protect him 
or herself by stating that, to avoid liability for omissions under 
Section 11, “an issuer need only divulge an opinion’s basis, or 
else make clear the real tentativeness of its belief.  Such ways 
of conveying opinions so that they do not mislead will keep 
valuable information flowing.”250 
How this will be received by issuers going forward remains 
to be seen.  Certainly, the Court’s decision may help to chill 
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misleading information, especially among riskier companies, 
but the question of what other disclosures it will chill may later 
need to be assessed.  In a comment soon after the release of the 
opinion, guidance was given to issuers and their counsel; it was 
first noted “that issuers have some power to control their own 
destiny.”251  It is advised that issuers can avoid Section 11 
liability by disclosing the basis for an opinion, allowing for an 
investor to evaluate the opinion on his or her own.252  An issuer 
might, however, allow for so many different factors that went 
into the decision to be disclosed that it would be hard for the 
investor to form the opinion.  If there were a legal compliance 
statement such as the one in Omnicare, two differing opinions 
to the legality would be helpful.  But if it is divulged that six 
different firms all gave differing opinions, it may become nearly 
impossible for an investor to know on which legal opinion they 
should rely.  There clearly is not a directive to inundate with 
every fact on which an opinion is based.  Which facts are best 
stated should be based on the judgment of the issuer, since an 
investor understands that an opinion is based on weighing 
disparate facts.253  But the judgment may lead to 
overcompensating in the release of information as an attempt 
to avoid liability.  Alternatively, this judgment may also lead to 
an issuer believing the cost of disclosing an opinion in a 
registration, even one that was disclosed prior to Omnicare, is 
too high and avoid making the statement altogether. Also, it is 
advised that issuers need to qualify their opinions “with 
appropriate ‘hedges, disclaimers and apparently conflicting 
information.’”254  Again, issuers might use more hedges and 
disclaimers that they would have in the past, rendering the 
opinion statement almost useless. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the Omnicare decision, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of whether opinions included in registration 
statements could be considered an “untrue statement of 
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material fact” or an omission of a material fact in an opinion 
could make registration statements misleading, and thus 
create liability under Section 11.255  Within the context of 
protecting the investing public, a new, but not completely 
defined, “rational basis” standard is given; registrants and 
investors might look to professional standards (e.g. the Code of 
Professional Conduct for CPAs) for parallels to what may 
satisfy the new, rational basis standard.  How the courts will 
react to the new rational basis test, however, is yet to be seen. 
Additionally, Justice Kagan argues that registrants should 
err on the side of disclosure against court case history that may 
suggest otherwise.  Amount of disclosure is a balancing act: in 
areas where statements of opinion may become actionable 
under Section 11, an issuer would be advised that including 
such a statement would become a risk, but an omission that 
leads to a registration statement becoming misleading also 
poses a risk.  Where liability may exist, there is a substantial 
burden of proof for liability on the investor.  Taken together, 
the Omnicare case has far reaching ramifications about what 
types of forward-looking opinions are best included or omitted 
in registration statements.  This may also impact other areas of 
securities laws, as the rationale from Virginia Bankshares, 
which was a case under the Exchange Act, was used to 
determine the liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act.  
It is also yet to be determined if now, the rationale from 
Omnicare will be used to create a rational basis test for liability 
under the Exchange Act, essentially becoming an extension of 
Virginia Bankshares. 
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